Creating a More Quit-Friendly National Workforce? Individual Layoff History and Voluntary Turnover by Davis, Paul R et al.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
2015 
Creating a More Quit-Friendly National Workforce? Individual 
Layoff History and Voluntary Turnover 
Paul R. Davis 
Cornell University, pdf359@cornell.edu 
Charlie O. Trevor 
University of Wisconsin at Madison 
Jie Feng 
University of Wisconsin at Madison 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Human Resources Management Commons, and the Labor Relations Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Creating a More Quit-Friendly National Workforce? Individual Layoff History and 
Voluntary Turnover 
Abstract 
While Bureau of Labor Statistics data reveal that U.S. employers laid off over 33 million employees since 
1994, virtually no research has addressed the behavior of layoff victims upon reemployment. In a first 
step, we investigate how layoffs shape voluntary turnover behavior in subsequent jobs. Utilizing a recently 
developed fixed effects specification of survival analysis, we find that a layoff history is positively 
associated with quit behavior. This effect is partially mediated by underemployment and job satisfaction 
in the post-layoff job. The remaining indirect effect is consistent with the notion that layoffs produce a 
psychological spillover to post-layoff employment, which then manifests in quit behavior.We also find that 
layoff effects on turnover attenuate as an individual’s layoffs accumulate and vary in magnitude 
according to the turnover “path” followed by the leaver. 
Keywords 
layoffs, turnover, quit behavior, underemployment, job satisfaction 
Disciplines 
Human Resources Management | Labor Relations 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Davis, P. R., Trevor, C. O., & Feng, J. (2015). Creating a more quit-friendly national workforce? Individual 
layoff history and voluntary turnover [Electronic version]. Retrieved [insert date] from Cornell University, 
ILR school site: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/1003 
Required Publisher Statement 
© American Psychological Association. Final version published as: Davis, P. R., Trevor, C. O., & Feng, J. 
(2015). Creating a more quit-friendly national workforce? Individual layoff history and voluntary turnover. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 100(5), 1434-1455. This article may not exactly replicate the final version 
published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/1003 
Individual Layoff History and Voluntary Turnover     ! 1 




Creating a More Quit-Friendly National Workforce? Individual Layoff 






Paul R. Davis 
Department of Management and Human Resources 
Wisconsin School of Business 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
 
Charlie O. Trevor 
Department of Management and Human Resources 
Wisconsin School of Business 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
 
Jie Feng 
Department of Management and Human Resources 
Wisconsin School of Business 






This research was conducted with restricted access to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. The 
views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the BLS. 
 
Please address correspondence to Paul Davis, Department of Management and Human 
Resources, Wisconsin School of Business, 975 University Ave, 5268 Grainger Hall, Madison, 
WI 53703, pdavis@bus.wisc.edu 
Individual Layoff History and Voluntary Turnover     ! 2 
Abstract 
While Bureau of Labor Statistics data reveal that U.S. employers laid off over 33 million 
employees since 1994, virtually no research has addressed the behavior of layoff victims upon 
reemployment. In a first step, we investigate how layoffs shape voluntary turnover behavior in 
subsequent jobs. Utilizing a recently developed fixed effects specification of survival analysis, 
we find that a layoff history is positively associated with quit behavior. This effect is partially 
mediated by underemployment and job satisfaction in the post-layoff job. The remaining indirect 
effect is consistent with the notion that layoffs produce a psychological spillover to post-layoff 
employment, which then manifests in quit behavior. We also find that layoff effects on turnover 
attenuate as an individual’s layoffs accumulate and vary in magnitude according to the turnover 













Individual Layoff History and Voluntary Turnover     ! 3 
Creating a More Quit-Friendly National Workforce? Individual Layoff  
History and Voluntary Turnover 
One of the standard mechanisms through which today’s companies attempt to cope with 
competitive pressures is through downsizing (Cascio, 1993). The extent to and manner in which 
downsizing contributes to subsequent organizational performance is a complex issue, with 
scholars offering explanations for both positive (e.g., Love & Nohria, 2005) and negative 
downsizing effects (e.g., Trevor & Nyberg, 2008). What there is no dispute about, however, is 
the prevalence of downsizing in the U.S.—the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports over 30 million 
layoffs between 1994 and 2010, a figure that does not include small-scale layoffs (i.e., those 
displacing fewer than 50 employees).  While layoffs are more numerous when firms are 
struggling economically (Cascio, 1993), company financial health, employee tenure, job 
performance, and industry all fail to protect American employees from the layoff axe (Cascio, 
2002). 
Often lost in the analysis of layoffs and their effects on the companies that initiate them is 
that a majority of layoff victims ultimately find new jobs. In the aggregate, these millions of 
victims therefore comprise an increasingly noteworthy proportion of this nation's workforce. 
Research documents the trauma and disruption that layoffs can bring to individuals, including 
damaging effects to income (e.g., Kletzer & Fairlie, 2003; Seninger, 1997), physical health (e.g., 
Kivimaki, Vahtera, Elovainio, Pentti, & Virtanen, 2003), mental health (e.g., Kets de Vries & 
Balazs, 1997), and general attitudes about work (e.g., Brockner et al., 1994; Konovsky & Folger, 
1991; Wanberg, Bunce, & Gavin, 1999). What remains unclear, however, is whether these or 
other layoff outcomes ultimately manifest in worker behaviors in post-layoff employment (Datta, 
Guthrie, Basuil, & Pandey). If layoffs do affect the behaviors of their victims upon 
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reemployment, layoffs become relevant not merely for the organizations that engage in them, but 
for all organizations. Indeed, behavioral changes after a layoff amount to material human capital 
changes within the external talent pool upon which virtually all firms rely. Hence, our aim here is 
to begin to determine how employee behavior is evolving as a function of the downsizing 
strategies that are now standard business practice (Cascio, 1993). 
One of the most crucial of these behaviors is voluntary turnover, which is notoriously 
expensive (e.g., Cascio, 2000) and, in the aggregate, is a critical predictor of a variety of 
organizational performance outcomes (Hausknecht & Trevor, 2011). We argue that a layoff 
history should be associated with greater voluntary turnover likelihood in post-layoff 
employment, a prediction that is supported through the development of a broad theoretical 
rationale that integrates complementary arguments from several otherwise distinct literatures. 
While these arguments explore different mechanisms for a layoff effect, each is consistent with 
the expectation that layoffs produce psychological effects that spill over into subsequent 
employment relationships and loosen the ties between employee and employer. Measures of job 
satisfaction and underemployment in the post-layoff job, as well as data on the reason for 
quitting, allow us to better infer whether any layoff-quit associations are consistent with our 
broad rationale. Thus, our work lays a theoretical foundation for the wider study of layoff 
victims’ behaviors in post-layoff employment. In exploring this framework, we provide the first 
direct evidence on whether important employee behaviors are a function of a prior employer’s 
severing of the employment relationship. Given that the broad and generally indiscriminant reach 
of layoffs affects tens of millions of American workers, the study also speaks to the potentially 
highly consequential effects of institutionalized downsizing on the subsequent stability of the 
modern American workforce.  
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Construct Definitions and Theory 
Layoffs can be understood as one avenue for downsizing, which is the planned reduction 
in workforce (Cascio, 1993). While natural attrition also constitutes downsizing activity (Cascio, 
2010), we focus on layoffs, defined here as the termination of non-temporary employment for 
business reasons (e.g., cost reduction). Although layoff victims may ultimately be selected from 
the feasible set according to, for example, their position in the performance distribution, a layoff 
requires that the initial decision to reduce headcount be motivated by business-level concerns. 
The post-layoff behavior of interest here is voluntary turnover, defined as any employee-initiated 
separation (i.e., a quit). We also explore two aspects of the post-layoff job as potential mediators 
of the proposed relationship: underemployment, which is present when the new job is inferior or 
of lower quality than the prior job (Feldman, 1996); and job satisfaction, the degree to which one 
is content with his or her job. 
Our theoretical approach to the issue of whether being laid off makes one more likely to 
quit in subsequent employment is built upon two rather distinct conceptual platforms. One of 
these is quite straightforward, primarily involving connecting bivariate relationships that are 
established within the literature. The other, however, while more intriguing, is also more difficult 
to study, requiring inferences about unmeasured mediating constructs to link the two readily 
observable events of interest here. In short, we envision that a layoff history results in greater 
likelihood of quitting behavior for two distinct reasons: (a) psychological spillover, in which 
experiencing a layoff leads to an untethering from, or looser tie to, subsequent employment, as 
suggested by the literatures addressing psychological contracts, trust, job insecurity, and the 
unfolding model of turnover’s shock construct; and (b) occupational underemployment, in which 
layoffs result in lower-quality post-layoff employment (see Figure 1). The former explanation 
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can both allow greater variety in layoff conceptualization (e.g., layoffs anytime in one’s 
employment history) and provide more compelling implications for theory and practice. Thus, 
we first describe the application of the various literatures that converge in support of the layoff 
experience itself spilling over into perceptions of looser ties to post-layoff employment. We then 
explore the occupation-based explanation (underemployment in post-layoff employment) for the 
layoff-turnover relationship. Finally, we further examine the validity of our conceptual 
framework by investigating whether the pattern of layoff effects on turnover across different quit 
reasons (i.e., turnover paths) is consistent with our theory. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Layoffs, Psychological Spillover, and Voluntary Turnover in Post-Layoff Jobs 
 Broadly, we suggest that the psychological ties that bind individuals to organizations are 
weakened by the experience of a layoff. This expectation of psychological spillover, in which a 
past layoff untethers the victim from subsequent employers, is evident in the lay business press’s 
frequent characterization of layoffs as precipitating a free agent mentality, leaving the workplace 
replete with employees with low levels of commitment and loyalty to the employer (O'Reilly, 
1994; Hirsch, 1987; Munk, 2000; Pink, 2001). Yet, specific theorizing is lacking to date. 
Fortunately, however, several conceptual frameworks suggest how this spillover can occur. 
While we are limited here in that we cannot measure the mediating mechanisms that we describe, 
the manner in which these literatures converge to yield the prediction of a positive layoff-
turnover association provides a strong, albeit indirect, conceptual basis for our hypotheses (see 
Figure 1).   
The psychological contract in post-layoff jobs. The psychological contract describes the 
reciprocal exchange agreement between employee and employing organization, as perceived by 
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the worker (Rousseau, 1989). While these perceptions of what is owed to, and from, the 
employer are influenced by the employee’s interactions with organizational representatives, 
complete information regarding employer intentions is unlikely, especially at early stages of the 
employment relationship (Rousseau, 2001). As a consequence, new employees rely on 
generalized employment schemas—mental organizing frameworks that frame the employment 
experience—to help guide the establishment of the terms of the psychological contract 
(Rousseau, 2001). We argue that layoffs affect these schemas and thereby influence post-layoff 
expectations of both employer and employee obligations surrounding long-term employment. 
Schemas, including those specific to employment, resist change. Nevertheless, they are 
affected by experience (Crocker, Fiske, & Taylor, 1984), with perceptions of substantial 
differences between schemas and experience bringing about adjustment (Rumelhart & Norman, 
1978). Being laid off would appear to provide such discrepant information. Indeed, research 
suggests that layoffs often engender, among victims, the negative affective experience of 
psychological contract violation (Brockner et al., 1994; M. S. Kim & Choi, 2010; McLean Parks 
& Kidder, 1994; Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Pugh, Skarlicki, & Passell, 2003; Rousseau, 1989) 
and the underlying perception that the organization has breached its obligations under the 
contract (Rust, McKinley, & Edwards, 2005). That layoffs yield perceptions of contract breach 
and negative violation reactions implies both that pre-layoff schemas are deficient in their 
weighting of the layoff threat (given that employment schemas guide expectations surrounding 
employer obligations) and that the victim’s attention will be focused on this deficiency. 
Accordingly, we argue that layoffs compel their victims to adjust employment schemas to allow 
for an increased likelihood of future layoffs. Given the reciprocal nature of psychological 
contracts, a greater salience of the layoff threat, because it indicates reduced employer 
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commitment to long-term employment, similarly frees the layoff victim from any such obligation 
in future employment relationships. Reduced felt obligation to remain with an employer, more 
formally characterized as low “normative commitment,” is associated with greater voluntary 
turnover in meta-analytic studies (e.g., Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002). 
Thus, while the separation of employee and employer after a layoff ends the employment 
relationship, we expect that employment schema change spills over to subsequent employment 
relationships, positively affecting victims’ voluntary turnover likelihood.   
Trust in post-layoff jobs. A second conceptual framework that predicts a layoff effect on 
voluntary turnover in reemployment is based on the trust literature. “Trust is a psychological 
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of the 
intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395). We 
suggest that a layoff from one job will reduce victims’ trust of subsequent employers. According 
to McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer (2003, p. 94), “rather than being based on direct experience 
with the object of trust, initial trust impressions can be based on trust in a source other than [this 
object], such as another individual or collectivity.” Stewart (2003) found empirical support for 
consumers exhibiting such “trust transfer” across organizational settings. In the context of a 
layoff, this trust transfer construct suggests that a victim’s initial trust in a post-layoff employer 
could be derived from his or her trust in the employer that previously imposed the layoff. In 
addition, trust is difficult to repair, requiring both the re-establishment of positive expectations 
and the overcoming of negative expectations (P. H. Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004). Hence, 
reduced trust in a layoff employer that is transferred to a subsequent job will tend to remain low. 
Empirical studies of layoff-driven trust effects support such conceptualizing. Pugh et al., (2003) 
and Kim and Choi (2010) each found that laid-off individuals held lower trust in the post-layoff 
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employer than in the pre-layoff employer, with Pugh et al., (2003) additionally finding increased 
cynicism and worry about mistreatment.  
Morrison and Robinson (1997) posited that low trust promotes employee monitoring of 
what the organization provides to the employee. An increase in such employee vigilance can, in 
turn, result in a greater likelihood of perceived discrepancies between the employee’s 
experienced outcomes and his or her expectations of what the organization is obligated to 
provide. This suggests, consistent with March and Simon’s (1958) stipulation that quitting will 
be more likely when perceptions of employee contributions exceed the perceived value of 
employer inducements, that reductions in trust will subsequently lead to more turnover.!Relevant 
research is consistent with these positions, with meta-analytic support for the negative 
relationship between trust in the employer and turnover intentions (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). 
Consequently, given the expectation that loss of trust spills over from the layoff-job to post-
layoff employment, we anticipate that layoffs will predict voluntary turnover in subsequent jobs. 
Shock impacts in post-layoff jobs. Similar to the case with the psychological contracts 
literature, analysis of the unfolding model of turnover (T. W. Lee & Mitchell, 1994; T. W. Lee, 
Mitchell, Wise, & Fireman, 1996) suggests that a layoff in one job can predispose an employee 
to be more likely to quit a later job. The basis for this extension across job boundaries is the 
model’s focus on incidents referred to as shocks. Shocks are jarring events that lead employees 
to make judgments about their jobs. Research on the unfolding model of turnover has shown that 
a layoff is a shock to the system that launches psychological decision processes associated with 
quit behaviors among layoff survivors (T. W. Lee et al., 1996; Trevor & Nyberg, 2008). While 
the implications of layoffs-as-shocks have yet to be addressed among layoff victims, the 
literature surrounding the unfolding model suggests that victims’ evaluations of the post-layoff 
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work context should be affected. Specifically, Lee and Mitchell (1994) describe shocks as 
shaking employees from natural inert tendencies regarding the external job market. While 
attention to the daily routines of work and family life often divert attention away from alternative 
job opportunities, shocks force people into reappraisal of job-relevant data: “shocks to the system 
constitute the jarring event that forces people to notice readily available opportunities” (Lee & 
Mitchell, 1994, p. 71). Although shock effects across jobs have not been addressed in the 
unfolding model literature, a shock’s impact on the awareness of outside opportunities should be 
quite salient to those forced to suffer the psychological, social, and financial ramifications of a 
layoff. Indeed, Lee and Mitchell (1994) note that, more generally, shocks heighten a person’s 
need to understand the organizational environment. For the layoff victim, the relevant 
organizational environment is associated with the post-layoff job, rather than the job from which 
he or she was displaced.  
Hence, we posit that individuals reemployed following a layoff shock will be more likely 
to attend to external job opportunities. With greater awareness of alternatives, it is increasingly 
likely that a prospective employer offering utility that exceeds that associated with the current 
employer will be discovered. This imbalance then results in a greater tendency to quit (March & 
Simon, 1958; Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, & Meglino, 1979; Trevor, 2001). 
Job insecurity in post-layoff jobs. The lay business press has long proclaimed the 
existence of the layoff-based psychological spillover and untethering that we adopt as our 
general conceptual frame. Specifically, these sources have argued that the prevalence of layoffs 
in the U.S. economy has created a free-agent mentality in which worker perceptions of job 
security, and subsequently their loyalty, have greatly diminished (O'Reilly, 1994; Hirsch, 1987; 
Munk, 2000; Pink, 2001). Perceptions of job insecurity, defined as concerns about continuity in a 
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job situation (Davy, Kinicki, & Scheck, 1997), and reduced loyalty should be especially 
prevalent among layoff victims, who, having been previously targeted for layoff, are less likely 
to underestimate the threat of layoff. The job insecurity research, however, does not explicitly 
address the key spillover assumption underlying the lay business free-agent argument—i.e., that 
a layoff event induces job insecurity upon the victim’s reemployment. A recent qualitative study 
of 77 unemployed layoff victims, however, does find that layoffs yielded the adoption of a free-
agent mentality in which there was no expectation of loyalty from either employer or employee 
(Mendenhall, Kalil, Spindel, & Hart, 2008). To the extent that these no-loyalty expectations 
continue as the unemployed are hired into post-layoff jobs, this study supports the psychological 
spillover across jobs that we espouse. 
Should such spillover of job insecurity perceptions to post-layoff employment exist, the 
extant research on job insecurity effects suggests that layoffs will, via greater job insecurity 
perceptions, lead to quit behavior in post-layoff jobs. This inference is consistent with the meta-
analytic finding of a negative association between job insecurity perceptions and organizational 
commitment (Cheng & Chan, 2008; Sverke, Hellgren, & Näswall, 2002), which is negatively 
related to turnover (e.g., see Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner (2000) for meta-analytic support), as 
well as a positive association between job insecurity and emotional exhaustion (Boswell, Olson-
Buchanan, & Harris, 2014), which is positively tied to turnover behavior (e.g., Lapointe, 
Vandenberghe, & Panaccio, 2011). Moreover, meta-analyses report strong evidence that 
perceived job insecurity and turnover intent are positively related (Cheng & Chan, 2008; Sverke 
et al., 2002), further suggesting that a layoff history makes one more likely to quit. 
Layoff effects on voluntary turnover. The literatures on psychological contracts, trust, 
employment shocks, and job insecurity all suggest that the psychological impact of a layoff spills 
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over into subsequent employment, yielding an untethering from the job, as characterized by 
adapted employment schema and reduced felt obligation, enhanced awareness of external job 
opportunities, lower trust, and heightened perceptions of job insecurity. Thus, given that these 
factors serve to increase the ease in and attractiveness of quitting, we expect a greater probability 
of voluntary turnover in jobs that follow a layoff.  
Hypothesis 1: A layoff history increases the probability of voluntary turnover. 
Attenuation of layoff effects (curvilinearity). As layoffs accumulate, however, it is likely 
that the layoff impact on the explanatory mechanisms eventually weakens. With each layoff, 
ensuing adjustments to general employment schema and perceived obligations of employers 
leave subsequent layoffs less likely to be inconsistent with the psychological contract. Similarly, 
with sufficient layoffs, employee trust in the employer’s personnel decisions and employee 
expectations of job security are likely to be almost completely eroded, at which point additional 
layoffs should not yield further untethering from post-layoff jobs. Moreover, the degree to which 
a layoff constitutes a shock should degrade over repeated experience with being laid off, thereby 
reducing increases in the deliberate appraisal of alternative opportunities; at the same time, with 
accumulated layoff shocks, the attention available to be focused on alternative employment 
opportunities is likely to approach a ceiling. In sum, when understood as a likely outcome, an 
additional layoff eventually should have diminished influence, once reemployed, on felt 
obligation, trust, job insecurity, and assessment of job alternatives.  
Although no previous research has examined the influence of multiple layoffs on 
individual attitudes or behaviors, this expectation of curvilinear layoff effects is also supported 
by Pierce and Aguinis’ (2013) recent argument that, within the management literature, “all 
seemingly positive monotonic causal relations (i.e., X ! Y) reach a context-specific inflection 
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point, I, after which they cease to be positive, resulting in an overall pattern of curvilinearity” (p. 
317) and by an established precedent for non-linearity in voluntary turnover likelihood (e.g., 
Nyberg, 2010; Salamin & Hom, 2005; Trevor, Gerhart, & Boudreau, 1997). We therefore 
anticipate smaller effects on voluntary turnover behavior as layoffs accumulate. 
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between a layoff history and voluntary 
turnover attenuates with multiple layoffs. 
Layoffs, Underemployment, and Voluntary Turnover in Post-Layoff Jobs  
Arguments for psychological spillover and weakened ties to post-layoff employers 
obscure the fact that a layoff may also reduce the quality of future employment (Karren & 
Sherman, 2012). Feldman (1996), for example, argued that, after a layoff, individuals are likely 
to experience underemployment—defined as inferior or lower quality employment, as compared 
to some standard (e.g. a past job). Underemployment is, in turn, negatively related to job 
satisfaction, a classic turnover antecedent, and positively related to job search and the intention 
to quit (e.g., Feldman, Leana, & Bolino, 2002; D. C. Maynard, Joseph, & Maynard, 2006; 
McKee-Ryan & Harvey, 2011), consistent with Mobley’s (1977) influential characterization of 
voluntary turnover as a function of the relative levels of current employer utility and expected 
alternative employer utility. Thus, independent of psychological spillover, layoffs may contribute 
to turnover simply because the victims are reemployed in inferior jobs (see Figure 1). 
Post-layoff jobs may involve lower pay, which is how underemployment is commonly 
described and operationalized (e.g., Feldman, 1996; Feldman et al., 2002). In addition to wage 
underemployment, hours underemployment, sometimes referred to as involuntary part-time 
status (i.e., employment that offers fewer hours than the employee would prefer) appears in the 
literature as an alternative operationalization (e.g., Maynard, et al., 2006). While we investigate 
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wage and hours underemployment here, we note that inferior jobs, of course, also can entail 
additional drivers of job dissatisfaction, such as lower quality benefits, promotion opportunities, 
working conditions, co-workers, and supervisors. To account for such sources of dissatisfaction 
that arise from lower quality jobs, and given job satisfaction’s well established status as a 
turnover antecedent (e.g., see Griffeth, Hom, and Gaertner (2000) for meta-analytic support), we 
investigate both job satisfaction and underemployment as evidence that lower quality jobs 
mediate layoff effects. Hence, based on the assumption that layoff victims should be more likely 
to quit when they find themselves reemployed in inferior jobs, we predict that underemployment 
and job satisfaction partially mediate the positive effect of layoffs on victims’ subsequent 
voluntary turnover. Further, given the causal ordering described above, we anticipate that layoff-
driven underemployment operates on turnover through dissatisfaction, as low pay or inadequate 
hours are likely viewed by employees as undesirable characteristics of the post-layoff job.1 
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between a layoff history and voluntary 
turnover is partially mediated by underemployment. 
Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between a layoff history and voluntary 
turnover is partially mediated by job satisfaction. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 Notably, the proportion of the layoff effect not mediated by underemployment and job 
satisfaction (i.e., the direct effect of layoffs on voluntary turnover) represents the effect available 
for explanation by the four processes described earlier in the psychological spillover section. We 
emphasize, however, that the presence of a direct effect is evidence only that underemployment 
does not fully mediate a layoff-turnover relationship, and does not, in and of itself, support the 
presence of any of these psychological spillover explanations. 
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Hypothesis 5: The indirect effect of a layoff history on voluntary turnover that is 
partially mediated by underemployment is further mediated by job satisfaction. 
Layoffs and Voluntary Turnover Paths 
 We have contended that layoff victims are more likely to leave reemployment for two 
distinct reasons: an untethering from post-layoff jobs that spilled over from the layoff event and 
reemployment in lower quality jobs that results in underemployment and lower job satisfaction. 
The validity of the former of these two explanations can be further examined by exploring 
relative layoff effects along different voluntary turnover “paths” that leavers follow. Recently, T. 
H. Lee, Gerhart, Weller, and Trevor (2008) demonstrated that the influence of job satisfaction, 
the most researched turnover antecedent in the literature, depended on whether one quit to search 
for another job, quit to take another job following a successful search, quit to take an unsolicited 
job offer, or quit for family reasons; these turnover paths approximated several of the distinct 
paths to leaving originally proposed in the unfolding model of turnover (T. W. Lee & Mitchell, 
1994; T. W. Lee, Mitchell, Holtom, McDaniel, & Hill, 1999). Just as their path-specific results 
better explained how job satisfaction functions in various turnover decision processes, 
investigating layoff effects across separate paths can yield meaningful inferences into turnover 
decision processes influenced by layoffs. That is, should a layoff history reduce one's sense of 
being tied or tethered to post-layoff employment, we should not only see layoff effects on quits, 
but should also see a predictable pattern of effects across various turnover paths. 
 Two of the four paths studied by T. H. Lee et al. (2008)—quitting to accept an 
unsolicited job offer and quitting to accept a solicited job offer (i.e., an offer that arose from a 
successful job search)—appear particularly susceptible to the influence of psychological 
spillover and untethering. Because the job offer's presence means that, at the turnover decision 
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point, virtually no effort is required to secure and enter into a new job, these two paths are 
characterized by maximum levels of March and Simon’s (1958) fundamental construct of ease of 
movement in the job market (T. H. Lee et al., 2008). As such, employees with a job offer and a 
layoff history possess both a viable alternative employment option and diminished psychological 
tethering to the post-layoff employer. Essentially, a reasonable job offer makes it easy for the 
reemployed layoff victim to move and the looser ties to the employer suggests there is little 
reason not to do so. Given this rather potent combination of ingredients for deciding to quit, we 
expect layoffs to readily predict voluntary turnover in paths where an offer preceded the quit 
decision (controlling for layoff effects that operate through job satisfaction and 
underemployment).  
Hypothesis 6: A layoff history increases the probabilities of quitting to accept an 
unsolicited job offer and of quitting to accept a solicited job offer.  
When one quits to search for a new job, March and Simon’s (1958) ease of movement is 
considerably lower than the complete ease of movement enjoyed when an offer is present. This 
lower ease of movement in the job market presents uncertainty, as a reasonable offer must first 
be obtained by search, limiting the extent to which weakened ties to a post-layoff employer 
provide a known and straightforward transition into the next job. Further, when quitting to 
search, choosing to leave also means enduring unemployment, an undesirable condition into 
which layoff victims have particularly vivid insight. Thus, given that quitting to search for 
employment, relative to quitting with an offer in hand, yields reduced levels of both ease and 
desirability of movement, we predict the following:  
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Hypothesis 7: The layoff effect on quitting to accept an unsolicited job offer and 
on quitting to accept a solicited job offer should each be greater in magnitude 
than the layoff effect on quitting to search for a new job.    
Data and Method 
Sample 
Our study draws data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 Cohort 
(NLSY79), which is one of several national longitudinal survey programs administered by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The NLSY79 is particularly suited to the research questions 
examined here as it includes multiple survey administrations that retrospectively capture the 
employment histories of a large and diverse sample of American men and women. The first 
survey was given in 1979 when respondents were between 14 and 22 years old. The NLSY79 
has followed these same individuals across 23 follow-up surveys, conducted either annually or 
biennially, resulting in an ongoing panel that begins January 1, 1978. The most recent 
administration of the NLSY79 was completed in 2010. With each survey administration, data are 
collected for each of (up to) five jobs held since the last survey (or, in the case of the first 
administration, the five most recent jobs). From these data, we sampled “job spells”— periods of 
full-time employment with a single employer. Job spells begin when the surveyed individual 
joins an organization and end when there is a voluntary or involuntary separation (e.g. layoff, 
termination, quit, etc.). We note that the comprehensive employment history data contained 
within the NLSY79 yields multiple job spells per respondent, facilitating a within-subjects 
assessment of the layoff effect. 
As the NLSY79 panel has progressed, some aspects of work history have been addressed 
only intermittently (e.g., respondents were polled about unsolicited job offers only in certain 
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survey years), while others are addressed with varying levels of specificity across survey 
administrations (e.g., response options for the item assessing the reason a respondent left a job 
are not standardized across the panel). As a consequence, it was necessary to draw two samples 
of job spells, each from different sections of the NLSY79 panel, in order to create measures that 
accurately reflect our constructs and fully address our research questions. In both samples, we 
exclude job spells during which the individual was less than 18 years old, was self-employed, 
was employed for no pay in a family business, was employed part-time (defined as working less 
than 30 hours in the first or last week of a job), was in the military, or for which data were 
missing on focal variables. This allowed us to confine our analyses to adult full-time employees 
who have the option to voluntarily separate from their current employer (see T. H. Lee et al., 
(2008) for similar exclusions). Because we use a fixed effects methodology (described below) 
that requires within-individual variation in variable values, our analyses further exclude all job 
spells of any NLSY79 respondent who did not report at least one instance of voluntary turnover 
and one layoff during the panel. We note that an overwhelming majority (over 90%) of NLSY79 
respondents reported at least one voluntary exit. Layoffs, though not as widespread as voluntary 
turnover, also affect a significant proportion of NLSY79 respondents: approximately one third of 
respondents reported at least one layoff across the duration of their job histories while 
approximately 10% reported more than one layoff. 
Our first sample of job spells—which we use to test Hypotheses 1 through 5—includes 
the full work history of each individual respondent: 12,035 job spells held by 2,439 individuals. 
Of these spells, 4,907 ended with a layoff. Across person-job-years, this sample was 66.2 % male 
and 48.4 % white, and ages ranged from 18 to 53 years (mean age = 31.8). A second sample was 
required to test Hypotheses 6 and 7, which proposed differential effects of layoffs across three 
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separate pathways to voluntary turnover. The need for the second sample arose because surveys 
administered prior to 1990 did not distinguish among (a) quits to accept an unsolicited job offer, 
(b) quits to accept a solicited job offer, and (c) quits initiated to engage in job search. The 1990 
survey, however, revised the assessment of employment terminations such that jobs ending after 
1990 can be classified into one of the three voluntary turnover groups. Consequently, while we 
are able to utilize each respondent’s entire work history to generate our predictor (i.e., prior 
layoffs), all job spells ending before the 1990 survey administration are excluded from our 
analysis of voluntary turnover likelihood. Hence, the second sample contains 4,206 spells in total 
(held by 821 individuals). NLSY79 respondents in this sample reported 1,805 layoffs over the 
course of their full work histories (i.e., between 1978 and 2010). The second sample was 71.6% 
male, 50.1% white, and ranged in age from 20 to 53 (mean age = 34.6). See Table 1 for a 
summary of the sample differences.  
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
Measures 
In addition to the narrative information provided in this section, we list and describe all 
variables in Tables 1 and 2.  
Voluntary turnover. With the survey following the conclusion of a job, NLSY79 
respondents report, from a list of pre-determined options, the “main reason” that they left that job. 
From this item, we created a dichotomous outcome variable that identifies, for all job spells 
included in Sample 1, instances of voluntary turnover (coded 1 for voluntary turnover, 0 
otherwise). All exits explicitly identified as a quit (e.g., “Quit to look for another job”, “Quit for 
pregnancy or family reasons”, “Quit for other reasons”, etc.) or that otherwise suggested an 
employee-initiated separation (e.g., “Moved to another geographic area”, “Found a better job”, 
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“Pay too low”, etc.) were coded as voluntary turnover. Responses indicating an employer-
initiated separation (e.g., “Layoff”, “Fired”, “End of temporary/seasonal job", etc.) were coded 0. 
Censored job spells (i.e., those that did not end within the observation window or for which no 
reason for separation was given) were also coded 0 (e.g., Salamin & Hom, 2005; Trevor, 2001). 
Sample 2, which is used to assess Hypotheses 6 and 7, requires greater specificity in the 
voluntary turnover outcome measure. We followed the methodology described by T. H. Lee et 
al., (2008) to create three additional dichotomous variables that distinguish among the voluntary 
turnover paths of interest. The first variable (Quit to search for offers) is coded 1 if an NLSY79 
respondent had selected the response option “Quit to look for another job” as the main reason for 
leaving a job. Job spells that end for all other reasons, as well as those that are censored, are 
coded 0. The second variable (Quit to take a solicited offer) is coded 1 if an NLSY79 respondent 
had selected the response option “Quit to take another job” as the main reason for leaving a job 
and, additionally, had indicated on a follow-up survey item that he or she had been engaged in 
job search at the time the job offer was received (and was coded 0 otherwise). The third variable 
(Quit to take an unsolicited offer) similarly required that the NLSY79 respondent had indicated 
that he or she “Quit to take another job”, but was coded 1 only when the follow-up item 
indicated that job search had not taken place (and was coded 0 otherwise). Because the follow-up 
item used to determine whether job search had preceded the quit was included only on surveys 
administered between 1990 and 2000, these latter two groups’ paths (i.e., Quit to take a solicited 
offer and Quit to take an unsolicited offer) reflect quits occurring between 1990 and 2000. The 
first path (i.e., Quit to search for offers) reflects quits occurring between 1990 and 2010.  
Prior Layoffs. The occurrence of layoffs, like instances of voluntary turnover, is captured 
by responses to the item assessing the main reason that the respondent had left a job. We used 
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the response options “layoff” and “layoff/job eliminated” to identify layoff victims throughout 
the survey window, except during the period from 1979 to 1983, where these options conflated 
job exits due to layoff with those due to the temporary/seasonal nature of a job. Because this 
latter exit is inconsistent with our definition of layoffs, we chose to exclude from consideration 
“layoffs” reported before the 1984 survey. Thus, for both Sample 1 and Sample 2, the layoff 
measures reflect all layoffs incurred between 1984 and 2010.2  
From the NLSY79’s record of layoffs, we created three separate measures that 
emphasize, for each of the job spells that make up an individual’s work history, a different facet 
of the individual’s layoff history (as of the job spell in question). The first measure is a dummy 
variable—layoff (ever)—that indicates whether the focal job began at any point after the 
respondent’s first layoff (i.e., coded 1 if a layoff had ever previously occurred; 0 otherwise). This 
specification allows assessment of the effect of the first layoff on voluntary turnover likelihood !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
 The inability to accurately identify layoffs occurring before 1984 presented two imperfect 
options. The first was to simply exclude all job spells that ended before 1984. However, this 
approach systematically left-censors the work history of any respondent with employment that 
ended prior to 1984. This is problematic as a majority of the observations dropped correspond to 
the “control group” (i.e., job spells occurring prior to a layoff), compromising fixed effects 
estimates that rely on a comparison of the duration of pre- and post-layoff job spells. Instead, we 
chose to retain all job spells ending before 1984 and right censor (i.e., code as 0) all pre-1984 
layoffs. This second approach, although it inadvertently assigns job spells that should be 
included in the “treatment group” (i.e., spells occurring after a layoff) to the “control group,” is 
preferable as it affects fewer individuals and results in a more conservative (or weakened) test of 
the effect of layoffs on voluntary turnover. 
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across all subsequent jobs. A second dummy variable—layoff (most recent job)—is similarly 
coded, except that it is coded 1 only when the focal job spell immediately follows (i.e., is 
adjacent to) a job that ended in layoff. Job spells initiated after the occurrence of a layoff that do 
not immediately follow it (i.e., job spells that are separated from the layoff by an intermediate 
job) are ignored in this operationalization. This measure therefore isolates a layoff’s effect on the 
likelihood of voluntary turnover in the next consecutive job. A final measure of prior layoffs 
specifies, as of the focal job, the number of previously experienced layoffs in the individual’s job 
history (cumulative layoffs), facilitating assessment of the individual effect of each additional 
layoff. We squared this cumulative index in order to model potential curvilinear effects of 
layoffs on voluntary turnover (cumulative layoffs2). 
We note that the NLSY79 distinguishes between layoffs targeting individuals within the 
workplace (reduction-in-force layoffs) and layoffs in which the entire workplace is shuttered 
(workplace closure layoffs). Victims of workplace closures have been shown to deem the 
organization’s explanation for the layoff as more acceptable and to evaluate the layoff itself as 
more fair than do those targeted for a reduction-in-force layoff (Wanberg et al., 1999). As such, 
the NLSY79’s workplace closure layoffs are less well-suited to our conceptual framework. All 
layoffs used in this study are of the reduction-in-force type, which comprise the considerable 
majority of the layoffs reported within the NLSY79. 
Underemployment. Scholars (e.g., Feldman, 1996; Feldman et al., 2002) describe 
underemployment as reemployment in jobs that are of lower quality; this is reflected in less-
advantageous compensation, skill utilization, and work status (i.e., involuntarily engaged in part-
time employment or in work that offers fewer hours than is desired). We assess the role of two 
facets of underemployment on the layoff-voluntary turnover relationship. 
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First, because a reduction in wage should be particularly relevant to the decision to quit, 
we examine the compensation facet of underemployment. Layoffs may leave their victims both 
financially strained and without ready alternatives for comparable employment, compelling them 
to accept jobs that pay less than those held previously. Research demonstrates that pay and pay 
growth are important to the voluntary turnover decision (e.g., Nyberg, 2010; Shaw, Delery, 
Jenkins, & Gupta, 1998; Trevor et al., 1997). A large decrease in one’s wage may evoke 
perceptions of inequity (Adams, 1963) or relative deprivation (Crosby, 1976; 1984), each of 
which is linked to voluntary turnover (Aquino, Griffeth, Allen, & Hom, 1997; Zenger, 1992). We 
include two measures of the compensation dimension of underemployment. The first measure, 
wage underemployment (cat.), is a 3-point scale in which 0 indicates an hourly pay increase (or 
no change) between the previous job and the current job, where 1 indicates a decrease that does 
not exceed 20% of the hourly pay received in the previous job, and where 2 indicates a decrease 
equal to 20% or more of the hourly pay received in the previous job. This categorical measure is 
with consistent Feldman’s (1996) definition of the wage underemployment construct, with 
others’ use of dichotomous underemployment measures using pay reduction cutoffs of 20% 
(Zvonkovic, 1988) and 33% (Elder, 1974), and with Feldman et al.’s (2002) use of a 20% or 
more pay reduction as the truncated anchor of their self-report underemployment scale.3 
Nevertheless, we recognize that the categorization of continuous data risks both the 
misrepresentation of continuous phenomena as discrete categories and loss of power (Cohen, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
 We recognize that our categorical operationalization is nevertheless somewhat arbitrary. 
Accordingly, we explored several alternatives, including the use of a 10% pay decrease criterion, 
a 30% pay decrease criterion for the 2 coding, and a dichotomized scale with a 20% cutoff. In 
each case, we found similar evidence of mediation. 
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1992). Accordingly, we also include a second, continuous measure, wage underemployment 
(cont.), equal to the change in CPI-adjusted hourly pay between the current job and the job held 
most recently (as a percentage of the pay received in the job held most recently). We multiplied 
this change by -1 such that greater underemployment (i.e., a larger reduction in pay) takes a 
positive value. 
In addition to the compensation dimension, we also investigate the mediating role of 
hours underemployment, defined as a desire for more working hours than are currently offered 
(McKee-Ryan & Harvey, 2011). While an ideal measure of this construct should incorporate the 
individual’s preference for working hours (e.g., Abrahamsen, 2010; Wilkins, 2007), the NLSY79 
data do not include this information, and we are therefore constrained to operationalize this 
construct according only to the change in working hours after a job change. Specifically, we 
created a continuous measure of the change in weekly hours worked between the current job and 
the job held most recently (as a percentage of the hours worked in the job held most recently). 
We multiplied this index by -1, such that greater underemployment (i.e., a decrease in hours 
worked) takes a positive value. 
Job satisfaction. Job satisfaction is assessed at each administration of the NLSY79 with a 
single item that asks respondents “How do you feel about your job with [employer name]?”. 
Responses are given according to a four-point scale where “like it very much” is coded 1, “like it 
fairly well” is coded 2, “dislike it somewhat” is coded 3, and “dislike it very much” is coded 4. 
We reversed this coding scheme to ease interpretation.  
Our use of a single-item global job satisfaction measure is consistent with prior research 
investigating voluntary turnover within the NLSY79 panel (e.g., Ganzach, 1998; T. H. Lee et al., 
2008; Maltarich, Nyberg, & Reilly, 2010; Trevor, 2001). Scholars have demonstrated that single-
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item measures, while often conjuring expectations of low reliability, are in fact preferable to 
summated measures of facet satisfaction when assessing overall job satisfaction (Scarpello & 
Campbell, 1983) and, moreover, exhibit substantial convergent validity with facet job 
satisfaction scales (Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997).4 Indeed, Ganzach (1998) noted that his 
results remained “very similar” when a multi-item measure, available for limited survey years 
only, was substituted for the NLSY79’s single-item satisfaction measure. 
Control variables. We control for the influence of several additional variables that 
describe the focal job (or that describe the respondent at the time of the focal job) and are 
associated with voluntary turnover and/or layoff likelihood. These include industry, as 
individuals employed in Manufacturing, Mining, Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing, 
Transportation/Communication, Recreational Services, Professional Services, Finance/Real 
Estate, and Other industry categories were, generally speaking, more likely to quit than those 
employed in Public Administration but less likely to quit than those employed in Construction, 
Business Services, and Trade/Personal Services. We also control for occupation, age, marital 
status, number of children, education level, residential area (i.e., urban or rural), hourly pay, 
mean occupational pay, weekly hours worked, employer size, number of prior non-layoff job 
changes, and the number of months spent unemployed after a layoff. Table 2 lists these variables 
and the rationale for their inclusion. 




 Wanous and Reichers (1996) additionally determined that a reliability of .70 was realistic, 
though likely conservative, for single-item scales, including a measure of job satisfaction.  
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We use survival analysis, also called event history analysis, to investigate the relationship 
between prior layoffs and voluntary turnover in the present job (see Allison (1984) for an 
introduction to survival analysis, or Morita, T. W. Lee, and Mowday (1993) for a discussion 
within the context of turnover research). Survival analysis is an increasingly utilized 
methodology in the prediction of turnover (e.g., Dickter, Roznowski, & Harrison, 1996; 
Kammeyer-Mueller, Wanberg, Glomb, & Ahlburg, 2005; T. H. Lee et al., 2008; Nyberg, 2010; 
Trevor, 2001). Rather than model a binary outcome, survival analysis makes use of longitudinal 
duration data to predict the instantaneous hazard of failure—the transition from one state to 
another. Applied to voluntary turnover, survival models predict the likelihood of transition out of 
employment (i.e., a quit) at time t, given “survival” up to time t-1 (we use weeks as the unit of 
time in our analyses). Because these models rely on the duration of each job spell to model the 
hazard of voluntary turnover, our estimates of layoff effects are conditional on job tenure.  
The use of “time-to-event” data carries analytical advantages over regression techniques 
that model only binary dependent variables. For example, survival analysis allows the use of data 
from right-censored spells, those that do not end within the study window and those that end for 
reasons other than the focal event (e.g., rather than drop spells in which the individual was fired 
for disciplinary reasons, survival analysis makes use of the fact that the individual did not quit 
during his or her tenure). Additionally, survival analysis’s handling of time-varying covariates is 
advantageous, particularly in the turnover context where change in antecedents over time is 
known to influence the decision to quit (Harrison, Virick, & William, 1996; Kammeyer-Mueller 
et al., 2005; Sturman & Trevor, 2001).  
We estimate voluntary turnover hazard using the Cox (1972) proportional hazards model. 
Models estimated to test Hypotheses 1 through 5 describe the instantaneous hazard of exit due to 
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any form of voluntary turnover (e.g., Nyberg, 2010; Salamin & Hom, 2005; Trevor et al., 1997). 
Models estimated to test Hypotheses 6 and 7, on the other hand, take on a competing risks 
specification (e.g., Allison, 1984; T. H. Lee et al., 2008) wherein the hazard of voluntary 
turnover is separately modeled across three distinct pathways (i.e., quits to accept unsolicited job 
offers, quits to accept solicited offers, and quits to engage in job search). These pathways are 
competing in the sense that once one of them is followed through, a job spell is no longer at risk 
of ending by way of the other two. The independence of the processes underlying these turnover 
paths (e.g., T. H. Lee et al., 2008) allows for cross-model comparisons within the context of 
competing risks survival analysis (Narendranathan & Stewart, 1991). 
The Cox model is considered semi-parametric in that it does not require that a functional 
form of the baseline hazard (i.e., the change in risk over time at baseline levels of covariates) be 
specified. Indeed, under the assumption of proportionality, the Cox model does not require a 
baseline function to compute hazard ratios, the coefficients that describe the multiplicative effect 
of a covariate on the baseline hazard. The semi-parametric nature of the Cox model is 
advantageous not only because a priori identification of the baseline is unnecessary, but also 
because it allows for a fixed effects specification of the model (Allison, 2009). Within the 
NLSY79 panel, most individuals report multiple job spells over the length of their work histories, 
allowing for the removal of unobserved sources of variation that remain constant within 
individuals. This is achieved within the Cox proportional hazards model by stratifying by 
individual, which affords each respondent a unique baseline function into which the unobserved, 
person-constant error is moved (Allison, 2009). Because the baseline is not used to compute 
hazard ratios, estimates are free of constant, person-specific error. However, because we allow a 
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unique baseline for each of the 2,439 individuals sampled, summary statistics that are typically 
presented with survival analysis models (e.g., cumulative baseline hazard) are not possible.  
Our use of the recently developed (Allison, 2009) fixed effects specification of the Cox 
model is notable in that it appears to be the first such instance within the management literature, 
although scholars have begun to advocate for the use of this method (Weller, Michalik, & 
Mühlbauer, 2013). We find that this Cox model, in which we stratify by individual, provides 
several advantages over a non-stratified model. Substantively, a fixed effects approach 
minimizes threats to internal validity; most critically, the methodology eliminates the likelihood 
that an unobserved, person-specific characteristic that is constant over time (e.g., motivation, 
ability, job performance, etc.) is driving both layoffs and voluntary turnover hazard. This 
problem, which amounts to dependence across spells, has commonly been addressed through the 
use of robust standard errors (e.g., Lin & Wei, 1989), though this method in no way accounts for 
potential bias in the effect estimates themselves. A few authors have attempted to address the 
potential for this bias through controlling for proxies for the omitted individual-level 
characteristics. Such attempts (Fichman, 1988; Trevor, 2001) follow Allison’s (1984) suggestion 
to control for the number of prior events and previous spell length. While this seldom-used 
methodology may be helpful, the fixed effects specification is a far more direct and 
comprehensive approach to eliminating the bias caused by a within-person omitted variable.5 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
 Nevertheless, there are drawbacks to the use of fixed effects survival analysis. Primary among 
them is the potential loss of power. Specifically, Allison (2009) notes that: a) individuals 
reporting only one spell, and those reporting only two spells where the duration of the second 
exceeds the first, are dropped from the analysis; and (b) because the analysis is driven by within-
individual variation on the covariates, biased estimates and inflated standard errors are possible 
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Although the fixed effects specification allows for a unique baseline hazard function for 
each of the individuals within the sample, predictors are nevertheless assumed to carry a 
proportional effect on the hazard across these baselines. We used Grambsch and Therneau’s 
(1994) proportionality test, which evaluates a null hypothesis of no relationship between 
Schoenfeld (1982) residuals and time, to test the proportionality assumption. Individual and 
omnibus tests indicated that our predictors did not violate the proportionality assumption. We 
employed the Efron (1977) method to account for transition events with tied job spell durations.  
Results 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations among variables are presented in Table 3. 
Estimates of hypothesized effects are reported in Tables 4 through 6. Within the fixed effects 
survival models estimated here, a statistically significant layoff effect indicates the change in the 
hazard of voluntary turnover, given a one-unit increase in the layoff variable. Unless otherwise 
stated, survival estimates are given in terms of the hazard ratio (HR), an exponential 
transformation of the raw coefficients. Subtracting 1 from the hazard ratio and multiplying by 
100 reveals the percent change in voluntary turnover hazard associated with a one-unit change in 
the predictor. For example, in Model 1 of Table 4, the hazard of quitting decreases 20% [(.80 – 
1)*100] with each one-unit increase in national unemployment rate.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We first examined whether an individual’s hazard for voluntary turnover increases after 
the experience of a layoff (Hypothesis 1). Fixed effects survival estimates for each of three 
operationalizations of the layoff construct are given in Table 4. We compared an individual’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
when this variation is low. Hence, using this improvement in survival analysis requires data with 
multiple spells (jobs in our case) per unit (individual in our case). 
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likelihood of voluntary exit prior to the first occurrence of a layoff to that across all jobs 
succeeding the layoff (Model 2). The positive, statistically significant hazard ratio associated 
with the layoff (ever) measure (HR = 1.56, p < .001) indicates that a quit is 56% more likely 
when at least one layoff appears in the individual’s previous job history. Consistent with this 
positive general effect, our test of the cumulative influence of multiple layoffs found that each 
additional layoff is associated with a 39% increase (HR = 1.39, p < .001; see Model 4) in an 
individual’s voluntary turnover hazard. Our analyses additionally isolate the effect of a layoff on 
an individual’s risk of voluntary turnover in the job immediately following displacement. 
Compared to the individual’s likelihood of quitting prior to their first layoff, voluntary turnover 
is 65% more likely (HR = 1.65, p < .001) in the next job after a layoff (see Model 3). Thus, 
across measures accounting for different temporal and types of effects, we found consistent 
evidence that prior layoffs predict a greater likelihood of voluntary exit, supporting Hypothesis 1. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Curvilinearity 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the positive layoff effect on quit hazard weakens with each 
additional layoff accumulated. We tested this assertion by including both linear and quadratic 
specifications of the cumulative layoffs measure in a fixed effects survival model predicting 
voluntary turnover likelihood. The statistically significant effect estimates given in Model 5 of 
Table 4 (HRCumulative layoffs = 1.63, p < .001; HRCumulative layoffs2 = 0.97, p < .001) indicate that the 
likelihood of quitting increases—at a declining rate—with each layoff incurred.6 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6
 We additionally conducted a sensitivity analysis that eliminated job spells associated with 
extreme numbers of prior layoffs from our assessment of curvilinearity. While the maximum 
number of layoffs associated with any job spell was 17, we found statistically significant 
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To illustrate the nature of the attenuation of the positive layoff effect, we plotted point 
estimates of the likelihood of voluntary turnover associated with successive increases to one’s 
total accumulated layoffs (see Figure 2). We graph raw coefficients as they allow a more 
accurate depiction of the change in turnover likelihood. Additionally, although the maximum 
number of reported layoffs was 17, we excluded layoff values greater than 10 from the plot 
because 99.9% of all observations were associated with 10 or fewer total layoffs. Figure 2 
therefore charts the change in the likelihood of voluntary turnover (relative to that under the 
condition of no layoffs) as the total accumulated layoffs increase. Analysis of the plot’s simple 
slopes (Aiken & West, 1991) provides a more formal assessment of attenuation (a simple slope is 
the tangent to the curvilinear plot at a particular level of the predictor). We found positive and 
statistically significant simple slopes for each additional layoff up to the sixth instance. 
Subsequent layoffs did not affect the likelihood of voluntary turnover (i.e., the simple slopes 
were not statistically different from zero), suggesting a plateauing quit hazard. Notably, our 
results indicate that, all else equal, those with four, five, and six layoffs in their work histories 
are 3.5, 4.7, and 5.9 times more likely to quit (relative to their quit likelihood in pre-layoff 
employment).7 Thus, survival effect estimates and simple slopes analysis each supported 
Hypothesis 2.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
curvilinear effects when prior layoffs were first capped at 15 and then at 10. Moreover, the effect 
persisted until all spells associated with five or more prior layoffs were eliminated. Even then, 
marginal support for the curvilinear effect remained until prior layoffs were capped at three.  
7
 We arrive at this final effect estimate by subtracting 1 from the relevant hazard ratio, which is 
equal to the exponentiated sum of the linear and quadratic raw coefficients associated with six 
layoffs (i.e., we exponentiate 6 times the 0.4868 raw coefficient on cumulative layoffs plus 62 
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[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Mediation 
Hypotheses 3 through 5 proposed that layoff effects on voluntary turnover are partially 
mediated through underemployment and job satisfaction. To the extent that layoff effects emerge 
due to psychological spillover, they would not operate through a layoff’s influence on the quality 
of the ensuing employment; hence, we expected only moderate levels of underemployment and 
job satisfaction mediation. Of our three layoff operationalizations, the layoff (most recent job) 
measure affords the most conservative test of this expectation of modest indirect effects, as the 
influences of a layoff on underemployment and job satisfaction are likely to be strongest in the 
job immediately following the layoff. Accordingly, we report mediation only for the effect of a 
layoff on the hazard of voluntary turnover in the first job following displacement.8 We present 
raw coefficients here rather than hazard ratios because they better illustrate mediation. To obtain 
the corresponding hazard ratio, the raw coefficient is exponentiated, i.e., HR = eb. 
We applied Sobel’s (1982) test of the joint effect of the predictor and mediator to the 
survival analysis context (Maltarich et al., 2010; Tein & MacKinnon, 2003) to assess the indirect 
effects carried through underemployment and job satisfaction separately (i.e., hypotheses 3 and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
times the  -0.028 raw coefficient on cumulative layoffs2, or e[(6*0.4868)+(36*-0.028)] = 6.86). 
Subtracting one from this hazard ratio (6.86 - 1 = 5.86) gives the 5.9 times greater likelihood of 
voluntary turnover associated with 6 layoffs. 
8
 We additionally tested for mediation across all jobs following the layoff (i.e., using the layoff 
(ever) and cumulative layoffs measures) and found support for the indirect influence of both 
underemployment and job satisfaction. However, as expected, these effects were smaller than 
those associated with the layoff (most recent job) measure. 
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4). We first examined the relationship between the layoff (most recent job) predictor and the 
mediators.9 As expected, we found that a layoff is positively related to both the continuous (b = 
0.21, p < .001) and categorical (b = 0.25, p < .001) measures of wage underemployment in the 
subsequent job and negatively related to subsequent job satisfaction (b = -0.02, p < .001). 
Surprisingly, while a layoff also predicted subsequent hours underemployment, the effect 
estimate was negative (b = -0.004, p < .001), indicating that weekly hours worked tend to 
increase in post-layoff employment. With statistically significant relationships between the 
predictor and mediators established, Table 5 reports fixed effects survival analyses estimating the 
effect of the mediators on voluntary turnover hazard. Survival models indicate that wage 
underemployment (b = 0.24, p < .001 and b = 0.21, p < .001; see Models 2 and 3, respectively), 
hours underemployment (b = 0.43, p < .05; see Model 4), and job satisfaction (b = -0.53, p < 
.001; see Model 5) are statistically significant predictors of the likelihood of voluntary turnover 
(controlling for the influence of the layoff). While this pattern of results suggests mediation 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986), Sobel tests provide a more formal assessment of indirect effects. These 
tests supported mediation of the layoff effect only through wage underemployment (z = 3.83, p < 
.001 for the continuous measure and z = 3.39, p < .001 for the categorical measure) and job 
satisfaction (z = 6.30, p < .001); no support was found for mediation through hours 
underemployment (z = 1.88, p > .05). And indeed, comparison of the baseline estimate of the 
total layoff effect (see Model 1) to those estimates that account for the indirect influence of the 
mediators reveals that while 5% to 6% of total layoff effect is attributable to an increased 
likelihood of subsequent wage underemployment (see Models 2 and 3, respectively) and 3% is 
due to negative effects on post-layoff job satisfaction (see Model 5), none of the effect is carried 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9
 These analyses are not reported in our tables but are available from the first author.  
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through hours underemployment. That hours underemployment did not mediate the layoff-
voluntary turnover relationship may owe to restriction of range in our operationalization of this 
underemployment predictor (e.g., our sample includes only full-time jobs and therefore omits 
decreases to weekly working hours following movement from full-time to part-time 
employment). We therefore took a separate sample that included both full-time and part-time 
jobs to create more hours underemployment variation. Model 8 of Table 5 shows that even here, 
there is no hours underemployment mediation (i.e., the layoff effect estimate in Model 8 is not 
substantially different from that in the baseline Model 7, and, moreover, hours underemployment 
does not predict voluntary turnover likelihood). We found similar lack of support when hours 
underemployment was measured in a categorical fashion (i.e., a dichotomous variable coded as 
“1” for any job change in which the individual moved from full-time to part-time employment). 
In sum, these mediation analyses, while consistent with Hypothesis 4, provide only partial 
support for Hypothesis 3. As indicated by Model 6, nine percent of the total effect of layoffs 
operated through wage underemployment (measured categorically) and job satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted a three-path mediation model wherein an indirect effect of prior 
layoffs on voluntary turnover likelihood was expected to operate sequentially through 
underemployment and job satisfaction (i.e., the causal chain of Layoff!Underemployment! 
Job Satisfaction!Voluntary Turnover). We assessed the validity of this mediated path with a 
joint significance test and a product of coefficients test (using exact standard errors; (A. B. 
Taylor, MacKinnon, & Tein, 2008). Both supported three-path mediation of the layoff effect 
through wage underemployment and job satisfaction, although we note that a relatively small 
proportion of the total effect operates through this causal chain (i.e., less than 1%).  
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
Individual Layoff History and Voluntary Turnover     ! 35 
Distinct Paths to Voluntary Turnover 
We used a competing risks analysis to separately model the effect of prior layoffs on 
three distinct groups of voluntary leavers: (a) those who quit to accept an unsolicited job offer, 
(b) those who quit to accept a solicited offer (i.e., those who quit to accept a job that had been 
identified through job search), and (c) those who quit to search for a job. While the layoff 
predictors included in these competing risks analyses reflect each respondent’s full work history, 
only those job spells that ended (or were censored) after the 1990 survey were available to 
estimate the layoff effect for each voluntary turnover path (see Data and Method). Because this 
segmentation of the sample, coupled with the competing risks, constrained the degree of within-
individual variation available for the layoff (ever) and the layoff (most recent job) predictors, we 
estimate the effect of layoffs across these three competing turnover pathways using only the 
cumulative layoffs temporal specification. 
Estimates of the effects of accumulated layoffs across each of the three turnover paths are 
presented in Table 6. In each model, we control for the influence of wage underemployment and 
job satisfaction in order to assess the total direct (unmediated) effect of layoffs on voluntary 
turnover likelihood.10 We found, consistent with Hypothesis 6, that a history of layoffs carries 
positive, statistically significant effects on the likelihood of voluntary turnover when the exit is 
associated with absolute ease of movement but not when the exit suggests restricted ease of 
movement. That is, the layoff effect emerged only when predicting quits facilitated by in-hand 
job offers. With each additional layoff, the likelihood of quitting to accept an unsolicited offer 
and the likelihood of quitting to accept a solicited offer, considered separately, increase by 88% !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10
 Recall that our rationale addressing the psychological spillover of layoffs into reemployment is 
best captured by the layoff influence that is independent of reemployment in an inferior job. 
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(HR = 1.88, p < .05; see Model 1) and by 63% (HR = 1.63, p < .01; see Model 2), respectively. 
Model 3 indicates that when these turnover paths are considered jointly (quitting to accept an 
offer), each additional layoff increases the likelihood of quitting to take another job by 66% (HR 
= 1.66; p < .001). As expected, however, a layoff history did not influence the likelihood of 
quitting to engage in job search (see Model 4).  
Hypothesis 7 proposed statistically larger positive layoff effects for turnover paths 
characterized by complete, rather than restricted, ease of movement. In order to evaluate the 
magnitude of the differences among the effects reported in Table 6, we made use of Lunn and 
McNeil’s (1995) interaction methodology for competing risks applied to Cox regression analysis. 
Statistically significant interaction effects indicated that the effect of accumulated layoffs on the 
likelihood of quitting to accept a solicited offer and on the joint likelihood of quitting to accept 
either an unsolicited or solicited offer were each larger (p < .05) than the layoff effect on quitting 
to engage in job search. However, the interaction assessing the difference in layoff effect 
between quits to accept an unsolicited offer (considered independently) and quits to engage in 
job search reached only marginal levels of significance (p < .10). Overall, these results support 
Hypothesis 7, particularly given that statistical power in tests of interaction effects is extremely 
sensitive to range restriction among predictors, and sample size (Aguinis, 1995), both of which 
are concerns here (e.g., only 171 sampled individuals reported quitting to take unsolicited job 
offers). Thus, our competing risks analyses support the expectation that a layoff history increases 
the likelihood of voluntary turnover in paths characterized by complete ease of movement (i.e., 
when one has an outside offer) and that the evidence is generally consistent with the expectation 
these effects exceed the layoff effect for exit paths characterized by restricted ease of movement 
(i.e., when quitting to search).  
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 [Insert Table 6 about here] 
Discussion 
The results of this study provide a nuanced assessment of the relationship between 
layoffs and their victims’ voluntary turnover behavior upon reemployment. We found generally 
robust support for our contentions that layoffs do lead to voluntary turnover from post-layoff 
jobs, that the effect size attenuates as layoff events accumulate, that the layoff effect is partially 
mediated by victims’ tendencies to work in lower quality post-layoff jobs, and that the layoff 
effect is greater when quitting to accept an existing offer (high ease of movement) than when 
quitting to search. Notably, the relative magnitudes of the direct and indirect effects in the 
mediation analyses and the pattern of results in the competing risks models examining different 
voluntary turnover paths are consistent with—and thus indirectly supportive of—our model of 
layoff effects on victims’ psychological experience of subsequent employment. And while our 
data do not allow us to validate this model, what is lost in theoretical precision is offset by the 
opportunity for methodological rigor: the NLSY79’s comprehensive employment history data 
allow both for within-subjects estimates of layoff effects and a thorough approach to the 
operationalization of the layoff construct, each strengthening the validity of our findings. 
The Layoff Construct 
Given an absence of research addressing layoff effects on post-layoff work behaviors, we 
took several perspectives on what constituted a layoff history. Indeed, it seemed likely that 
victims conceive a layoff history differently (and vary in their post-layoff behaviors) according 
to the current job’s temporal distance from prior layoffs and to the accumulated layoff total. 
Consequently, we utilized three layoff operationalizations (the presence of at least one layoff in 
one’s work history prior to the current job, a layoff from the job held immediately prior to the 
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current job, and the cumulative number of layoffs prior to the current job). This approach allows 
for more exacting conclusions surrounding the effects of layoffs. We urge researchers addressing 
layoffs as a key outcome or antecedent in future studies to carefully consider our variety of 
approaches and the implications of layoff operationalization in their work. 
Key Findings and Theoretical Contributions  
Our broadly conceived theoretical argument that a layoff’s psychological effects spill 
over into subsequent employment relationships advances the reach of four (largely) separate but 
complementary theoretical literatures, each converging on this expectation of spillover. The 
literature surrounding psychological contracts, for example, suggests that layoffs affect victims’ 
general employment schemas, which influence subsequent expectations of reciprocal obligation 
between employee and employer. The trust literature similarly provides a mechanism for 
spillover through the construct of trust transfer, which allows that a layoff-precipitated loss of 
trust in the layoff employer transfers to post-layoff employers. Scholars studying job insecurity 
have drawn links between this construct and both organizational commitment and voluntary 
turnover (Cheng & Chan, 2008; Griffeth et al., 2000; Sverke et al., 2002), providing a theoretical 
basis for the frequent observation by the lay press that layoffs decrease perceptions of job 
insecurity and, subsequently, loyalty. Finally, to the extent that layoffs act as employment 
shocks, our adaptation of the unfolding model of turnover suggests that victims become more 
vigilant about opportunities for alternative employment and remain so even in post-layoff 
reemployment. Notably, our arguments represent the first extension of these theoretical 
perspectives to predict cross-organizational spillover effects on behavior. As such, our 
framework addresses a conceptual gap in the literature surrounding layoff victimhood and 
provides a platform for the first study of layoff consequences on victim’s post-layoff behaviors.  
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Absent measures of the psychological mechanisms that underlie the spillover framework, 
we pursued an analytical strategy that assesses the validity of hypotheses consistent with, though 
not directly evaluative of, this theoretical perspective. Support for psychological spillover is first 
suggested by the finding, across each of three operationalizations of the prior layoffs construct, 
that layoffs carry large positive effects on post-layoff voluntary turnover likelihood. Compared 
to the probability of voluntary turnover prior to ever experiencing a layoff, the hazard of quitting 
is 56% higher (across all subsequent jobs) after suffering at least one layoff and 65% higher in 
the job immediately following a layoff. Further, voluntary turnover likelihood increases 39% for 
each individual instance of layoff. The finding that the layoff effect endures across all post-layoff 
jobs is particularly amenable to the psychological spillover argument—should a layoff alter 
victims’ general employment schemas and their attention given to alternative employment 
opportunities, the influence of the layoff could reasonably persist across multiple post-layoff 
employment relationships.  
Analyses additionally demonstrated that the marginal effect of each additional layoff 
waned, and ultimately disappeared, as the total number of layoffs experienced increased from 
one to six (see Figure 2). This declining positive effect is consistent with our expectation that 
layoff effects, and thus psychological spillover and untethering from (looser ties to) subsequent 
employment, are bounded by the natural range of variation in general employment schemas, trust 
and job security perceptions, and the employee’s capacity for attending to alternative 
employment opportunities (e.g., with repeated layoffs, felt trust and expectations of job security 
are likely to reach floor values, stemming any influence of additional layoffs). Nevertheless, each 
additional layoff up to the sixth instance did increase the likelihood of voluntary turnover, even 
though additional layoffs after the sixth yield no further increase in turnover likelihood (e.g., the 
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risk of quitting increased by 350%, 471%, and 586% after four, five, and six layoffs 
respectively).!
The results of our mediation analyses are additionally consistent with the argument for 
psychological spillover and untethering. While we found that the effects of layoffs did partially 
operate through underemployment and job satisfaction, the fact that these indirect effects were 
modest in size implies a relatively small role of layoff victims subsequently being hired into 
subpar employment. Indeed, of the total influence of a layoff on the voluntary turnover 
likelihood in the job immediately following the layoff, only 5% to 6% operated through wage 
underemployment and only 3% operated through job satisfaction. Because the vast majority of 
the layoff effect appears to be attributable to processes other than low quality reemployment, the 
psychological spillover explanation seems increasingly reasonable. 
As a fourth and potentially most compelling source of analytic evidence for our 
conceptual frame, we conducted competing risks analyses to examine the pattern of layoff effects 
across various turnover paths (i.e., quit reasons). As described in the rationale for Hypothesis 6, 
while a reasonable job offer makes it easy for the former layoff victim to move, the untethering 
effect of layoffs suggests there is little reason not to do so. Hence, though layoffs do not push the 
reemployed worker out the door, they make it easier to step through a door that is open. 
Consistent with this argument, layoffs clearly left victims more likely to quit to take a solicited 
or an unsolicited job offer. On the other hand, competing risks analyses revealed that layoffs do 
not affect the likelihood of quitting to engage in job search, a voluntary turnover pathway in 
which job satisfaction has a strong (negative) impact (T. H. Lee et al., 2008). In short, it appears 
that layoffs did not so much lead employees to quit post-layoff jobs in which they were unhappy, 
but rather freed them to quit when job opportunities were readily available. This interpretation is 
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also supported by statistically stronger layoff effects for quitting to accept an offer (i.e., quitting 
when there is complete ease of movement) than for quitting to search (i.e., quitting when ease of 
movement is less certain).  
Perceived ease of movement depends on the perception of the availability of other 
suitable jobs and is often described as a “pull” factor in turnover research (T.H. Lee et al., 2008).  
Interestingly, the NLSY79 data also allow us to explore an expansion of the notion of the pull of 
an outside job to a broader pull construct, in which we acknowledge that some leavers are pulled 
into quitting by factors other than ease of movement in the job market. Specifically, if our 
spillover framework is correct, we should see that prior layoffs enable those pulled to leave by 
family reasons to quit. Indeed, post hoc analyses confirmed this notion, as layoff history was 
positively related to the likelihood of quitting for family reasons, with the effect statistically 
greater than the effect of layoffs on quitting to search. Thus, it appears that family reasons for 
quitting, much like an extant job offer, likely represent a pull factor that the layoff victim, having 
been untethered from the post-layoff employer, is more free to pursue.     
Methodological Considerations 
 Several methodological issues warrant discussion. First, we applied a fixed effects 
specification of the Cox proportional hazards model, which, because it eliminates time-invariant, 
person-specific influences, affords greater confidence in effect estimates than do survival models 
that cannot account for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. Indeed, this methodological 
approach provides the rigorous comparison of layoff and non-layoff conditions that has been 
notably absent from previous studies of layoff effects. Accordingly, we join Weller and 
colleagues (2013) in encouraging turnover researchers (as well as those studying other time-to-
event phenomena) to pursue fixed effects survival models. We do caution, however, that the 
Individual Layoff History and Voluntary Turnover     ! 42 
validity of this analytical approach is contingent on the nature of the available data. For example, 
the within-subjects comparisons require that each subject contribute multiple spells to the 
analysis. Further, because effect estimates are unreliable under conditions of low within-subject 
predictor and outcome variation (Allison, 2009), the methodology is best suited to phenomena 
that allow subjects to accumulate a multitude of spells.  
 Our choice of a within-subjects methodology reflects an overriding concern that layoff 
victims and non-victims may be materially different across unmeasured variables, biasing the 
validity of estimates obtained through alternative (i.e., between-subjects) analytical strategies. 
Although minimization of this potential for unobserved heterogeneity bias is paramount for 
causal inference, we recognize the value of (valid) between-subjects comparisons. To that end, 
and as a second methodological consideration, we report supplementary analyses that estimate 
the voluntary turnover likelihood of layoff victims relative to that of non-victims (i.e., those who 
reported no layoffs across the full NLSY79 panel). We utilized three estimation strategies to 
generate these between-subjects estimates, each intended to correct for unobserved heterogeneity 
between the two groups. The Control Variable Correction approach includes controls for 
respondent cognitive ability, locus of control, race, and sex (because these controls do not vary 
within person, they could not be included in our fixed effects analyses). The Selection Dummy 
Correction approach includes a dummy covariate that indicates whether the individual ever 
suffers a layoff (i.e., 0 if the individual reports no layoffs across all job spells, 1 otherwise). We 
refer to this variable as a “selection dummy” because it should account for unobserved selection 
effects that may have influenced the likelihood of being a layoff victim versus a non-victim. 
Finally, the Shared Frailty Correction approach estimates layoff effects under a shared frailty 
specification of survival analysis (Raffiee & Feng, 2014). This approach is analogous to 
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estimating a random effects model (Allison, 2009; Gutierrez, 2002), here accounting for 
heterogeneity in the risk of voluntary turnover between layoff victims and non-victims. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Consistent with the fixed effects estimates of the layoff effect on voluntary turnover 
likelihood, these between-subjects survival analyses indicate a positive, though muted by 
comparison, layoff-turnover relationship, with support for curvilinearity also emerging (see 
Table 7). We speculate that the reason for larger estimates in the fixed effects models is that 
some aspect of the unobserved heterogeneity is acting as a suppressor variable, with failure to 
account for this aspect then artificially deflating the effect size. This speculation is supported by 
the finding that between-subjects estimates are lowest when demographic controls were used to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity, as this specification is the least rigorous of our three 
between-subject approaches to the elimination of such bias. Unfortunately, even under the more 
rigorous frailty and selection dummy approaches, we cannot know whether we have in fact 
accounted for the unobserved heterogeneity that can bias results. Fixed effects, on the other 
hand, is so rigorous (and conservative) precisely because it cleanly controls for the (time-
invariant) unobserved heterogeneity that we attempt to get at indirectly across each of these 
between-subjects analyses, thereby allowing the better estimate of layoff influence to emerge. In 
fact, to the extent that such heterogeneity is perfectly time-invariant, it is fully accounted for 
through fixed effects analysis. 
As a third methodological consideration that merits discussion, we address the role of 
time and layoffs in more depth. Although our alternative operationalizations of the layoff 
construct address the influence of the proximity of the layoff to the focal job, the NLSY79 data 
allow for deeper examination of the role of time on layoff effects, prompting us to consider 
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additional exploratory post hoc analyses. For example, we examined when, in the individual’s 
tenure with the employer, the layoff occurred and found that early-tenure layoffs and later-tenure 
layoffs did not differ in their subsequent influence on voluntary turnover likelihood in post-
layoff jobs. Moving from job tenure to career tenure, we found positive layoff effects of similar 
magnitude among individuals who experienced their first layoff early in the NLSY79 panel 
(between 1978 and 1995) and those who experienced their first layoff in the latter portion of the 
panel (between 1996 and 2010), suggesting a general consistency of effect over the prior four 
decades. We also found evidence to indicate that the influence of a layoff dissipates as the event 
that ended the last job (e.g., a layoff or quit) becomes more distant in time (here, time since last 
job is a function of both time between jobs and in subsequent employment). However, we note 
that the layoff effect nevertheless appears to persist as the victim moves between post-layoff 
jobs. Hence, the effect appears to decay over time, but not necessarily across post-layoff jobs. 
A fourth methodological consideration concerns the role of industry on the relationship 
between layoff history and voluntary turnover. It is perhaps reasonable to expect that 
psychological spillover is more pronounced in industry contexts that are characterized by a 
relatively low incidence of layoffs. Unfortunately, the NLSY79 does not provide adequate 
variation in focal variables for industry-specific fixed-effects survival analyses of layoff effects 
on turnover. However, we note that our analyses control for industry-specific influences on the 
layoff-turnover relationship.   
Finally, the lack of support for mediation of the layoff-voluntary turnover relationships 
through hours underemployment can perhaps be explained by the relatively weak construct 
validity. Feldman (1996) defines the working hours dimension of underemployment as a state of 
involuntary part-time, temporary, or intermittent employment, with relevant research indexing 
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the discrepancy between the employee’s preferred and actual working hours (Abrahamsen, 2010; 
Holtom, Lee, & Tidd, 2002; D. C. Maynard et al., 2006; Wilkins, 2007). Because the NLSY79 
data provide no indication of whether the individual is satisfied with his or her work hours, our 
measures are built on the crude premise that, post-layoff, a decrease in hours and that a move 
from full-time to part-time employment are each indicative of involuntary underemployment.11 
Thus, it is unlikely that our hours underemployment measures afford a rigorous assessment of 
the construct’s true effect. 
Future Research 
The absence of research addressing the impact of layoffs on victims’ subsequent work 
behaviors in general, and voluntary turnover in particular, leaves intriguing avenues available for 
future study. Layoffs could, for instance, carry positive effects for job performance in ensuing 
employment, as it is not unreasonable to expect layoff victims to redouble their efforts as an 
inoculation strategy against future layoffs (Boswell et al., 2014; Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 
1984). To the extent that victims worry that their past layoffs are a signal of low quality, these 
individuals may be motivated to perform in order to shed the negative association. Similar 
arguments can be applied to the effect of layoffs on alternative withdrawal behaviors, including 
absenteeism and tardiness. Additionally, to the degree that our arguments surrounding negative 
effects of layoffs on expectations of job security, perceptions of trust, and schema-based beliefs 
surrounding the threat of layoffs are valid, layoffs may also encourage permanent withdrawal 
from the labor force. Competing risks analyses indicated that layoffs made it easier to embrace !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11
 We note that the literature surrounding the wage facet of underemployment is, in contrast, 
defined according to objective wage change (Feldman, 1996). Our measure of this construct does 
not, therefore, suffer a similar threat to its validity. 
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both outside offers and the lure of staying home for family reasons, presumably through a 
reduced tethering to the job that simplified the individual’s responding to the outside pull (be it 
job-related or family-related). Thus, should permanent exit from the labor force offer a pulling 
force (e.g., via reduced stress from unsuccessful search, the opportunity to pursue non-work 
initiatives, etc.), layoffs may be even more damaging to the external talent pool than is implied 
by our results. 
Furthermore, should our spillover theorizing be valid, there is potential that the 
subsequent quit behavior of layoff victims in reemployment, and their possible permanent 
withdrawal from the labor force, vastly understates layoff effects on workforce stability. Trevor 
and Nyberg (2008) reported positive effects of downsizing on the likelihood that layoff survivors 
subsequently voluntarily exit the offending organization. Although surviving employees are 
spared the direct negative effects of the layoff (i.e., unemployment and stigmatization), the 
psychological consequences that we expect for layoff victims should still apply (e.g., surviving 
employees worry about future job security and experience loss of trust in the employer; Brockner, 
Grover, Reed, & DeWitt, 1992; Cascio, 1993). As such, surviving employees who have quit and 
become reemployed elsewhere may follow the same causal avenue toward voluntary turnover in 
the post-layoff work environment that we posited for layoff victims in subsequent employment. 
Given the unknown but certainly enormous number of layoff survivors in the labor force, 
survivors’ turnover behavior in subsequent jobs could have a massive, disruptive impact on 
workforce stability in the U.S. economy. As such, the future investigation of layoff effects 
should expand beyond the study of layoff victims to consider behavioral consequences for layoff 
survivors upon turnover and reemployment.  
Limitations 
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We find that layoffs are associated with a greater likelihood of voluntary turnover in 
subsequent employment, which we interpreted as consistent with our characterization of layoffs 
as resulting in psychological spillover to post-layoff employment. Unfortunately, we were unable 
to measure perceptions associated with our psychological contract, trust, job insecurity, and 
employment shock arguments. Future research that allows scholars to directly measure these 
perceptual constructs and test whether they mediate layoff effects on voluntary turnover would 
substantially help to clarify the extent to which our proposed explanations are valid.  
As we described in the methods section, early administrations of the NLSY79 do not 
allow the separation of temporary and seasonal job exits from layoffs. We therefore chose to 
exclude layoffs reported before 1984 in order to preserve the construct validity of our measures. 
To the extent that “layoffs” reported prior to 1984 do reflect layoffs as we have defined them 
(rather than temporary and seasonal job exits), the applicability of our results for layoffs 
experienced very early in the career is called into question. We note, however, that when we do 
include the questionable pre-1984 layoffs into our analyses (which would assume that layoffs are 
only trivially contaminated by temporary and seasonal job exits), our overall results do not 
change, and are in fact greater in magnitude.  
An additional limitation, one that alternative data sources may be better suited to address, 
concerns our examination of the mediating effect of underemployment. We were only able to test 
mediation through two of several potential operationalizations of the underemployment 
construct—the degree of the reduction in pay and working hours following a layoff, with the 
latter of compromised construct validity. It would therefore be beneficial to explore whether 
mediation is robust to a composite measure of underemployment, i.e., one reflecting person-job 
fit on the dimensions of education, skill, hours worked, and wages (Feldman, 1996). To the 
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extent that our underemployment (and job satisfaction) measures are deficient, we may have 
underestimated the degree to which these factors mediate the layoff-turnover relationship.  
Practical Implications 
 Our data indicate that layoff victims, once reemployed, are more likely to voluntarily 
separate from the organization. One ramification for these reemployed victims is that 
such behavior may ultimately cost them future opportunities, as each additional quit makes one 
more likely to be branded a “job hopper.” Thus, the layoff and subsequent unemployment likely 
do not comprise the final blow to the employee, as stigmatization for excessive quitting may join 
underemployment as long term detrimental consequences. 
At the firm level, given that turnover cost estimates, which include employee 
replacement, training, and outplacement (Cascio, 2000; Sturman, Trevor, Boudreau, & Gerhart, 
2003), are substantial, as estimates of per-leaver costs sometimes double leaver salary (e.g., 
Johnson, 1995; Solomon, 1988), it is no surprise that attempting to recruit and select employees 
who are more likely to stay is of considerable concern to management. Our findings, which 
might suggest that a layoff history acts as a turnover-based warning sign when hiring, could 
therefore suggest that managers view a layoff history as a potential liability when making hiring 
decisions. At this early stage of the research on layoff effects, however, we strongly caution that 
there may well be various moderators that would reduce or even reverse the general layoff 
effects reported here. Indeed, the increasing prevalence of layoffs (and therefore layoff victims) 
indicate that employers may be better served by adopting human resource management policies 
and practices that bolster trust, job security perceptions, and the psychological contract of new 
hires, as such approaches may enhance existing employee performance as well as mitigate post-
layoff turnover. Moreover, as ours is the first study of post-layoff behaviors, nothing is yet 
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known about the job performance of layoff victims upon reemployment. Given concerns about 
being targeted once again for layoff, these hires may be more motivated to perform than 
comparable applicants who have never experienced a layoff (Boswell et al., 2014; Greenhalgh & 
Rosenblatt, 1984). Additionally, the performance differences between post-layoff hires who 
leave and those who stay have relevant ramifications. Hence, future research on job performance 
in post-layoff employment, and on post-layoff performance’s interaction with turnover, would 
provide intriguing implications for considering layoff history in the hiring process. For example, 
it could be that the general positive layoff effect on post-layoff job turnover disappears, or even 
becomes negative, for high performers, who may more fully embrace their newfound rewards 
and opportunities, which could make hiring layoff victims beneficial for the organization. In 
sum, the potential practical implications of our findings are intriguing, particularly given the 
scope of layoffs in the U.S. economy, but more research is necessary to extract concrete 
recommendations on using layoff history as relevant data in hiring decisions.   
Conclusion 
 While considerable research indicates that layoff victims are adversely affected in a 
multitude of ways by the layoff experience (e.g., impaired physical and mental health, reduced 
trust, eventual underemployment), our work is the first to illustrate that layoffs produce 
behavioral consequences in subsequent employment. The turnover behavior of post-layoff hires 
also begins to reframe concerns over layoffs. Various authors have reported that the 
organizational performance consequences of downsizing are mixed (e.g., Cappelli, 2000; 
Madrick, 1995). Our findings, however, suggest a new, and rather ominous, concern – what is 
the standard downsizing practice doing to a substantial portion of the domestic labor pool? With 
millions of layoffs over recent years, what type of future employees are being created? Our study 
Individual Layoff History and Voluntary Turnover     ! 50 
suggests, all else equal, that commonplace layoffs may be contributing to a vast population of 
employees who are less likely to remain with their subsequent employers. Furthermore, recent 
work illustrates that companies engaging in layoffs experience increases in subsequent voluntary 
turnover (Trevor & Nyberg, 2008). Hence, while laying off employees provides a short-term cost 
reduction for the organization, this tactic may at the same time be contributing to turnover both 
within the company and economy-wide. Consequently, because increased turnover often results 
in reduced productivity and impaired financial performance (Hausknecht & Trevor, 2011), the 
layoff culture in American business might, ironically, begin to be seen as a problem for 
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Table 1. Description of Samples, Dependent Variables, and Key Independent Variables. 
Sample Description 
Sample 1 Includes all job spells reported across the duration of the NLSY79 
panel (1978-2010). Used to assess the main effect of layoffs on 
voluntary turnover, curvilinearity, and mediation. 
Sample 2 Includes all job spells reported as ending (or censored) between 
the 1990 and 2010 administrations of the NLSY79 survey. Used to 
assess the influence of layoffs on three distinct paths to voluntary 
turnover.  
  
Dependent Variable Description 
Voluntary turnover All employee-initiated separations. 
Quit for unsolicited offer Employee-initiated separation following the acceptance of an 
unsolicited job offer.  
Quit after successful search Employee-initiated separation following job search and the 
acceptance of job offer.  
Quit to search Employee-initiated separation to engage in job search.  
  
Independent Variable Description 
Layoff (ever) Coded 0 if the job spell precedes the individual’s first layoff. 
Coded 1 if the job spell follows the individual’s first layoff. 
Layoff (most recent job) Coded 0 if the job spell precedes the individual’s first layoff. 
Coded 1 if the job spell is the next job held after a layoff. 
Undefined otherwise (e.g., the previous job ended in a quit but the 
job prior to that ended in layoff). 
Cumulative layoffs As of each of an individual’s job spells, the total number of layoffs 
previously reported.  
  
Mediator Variable Description 
Wage underemployment (cat.) Reflects the change in adjusted hourly pay between the current job 
and the most recent job. Coded 0 for no decrease in pay, 1 for a 
decrease that is less than 20% of previous pay, and 2 for a 
decrease that is equal to or greater than 20% of previous pay. 
Wage underemployment 
(cont.) 
Reflects the change in CPI-adjusted hourly pay between the 
current job and the job held most recently (as a percentage of 
pay in the job held most recently). We multiplied this change by 
-1 such that underemployment (i.e., a pay decline) is positive.  
Hours underemployment Reflects the change in weekly hours worked between the 
current job and the job held most recently (as a percentage of 
the hours worked in the job held most recently). We multiplied 
this change by -1 such that greater underemployment takes a 
positive value.  
Job satisfaction Employee reported job satisfaction, assessed at each 
administration of the NLSY79. Response options ranged from 1 
(dislike job very much) to 4 (like job very much).  
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Table 2. Description of Control Variables.  
 
Control Description 
Industry We identified 12 common industrial categories across the coding schemes 
used in the NLSY79. Individuals employed in Manufacturing, Mining, 
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing, Transportation/Communication, Recreational 
Services, Professional Services, Finance/Real Estate, and Other industry 
categories were, generally speaking, more likely to quit than those 
employed in Public Administration but less likely to quit than those 
employed in Construction, Business Services, and Trade/Personal Services. 
Occupation We included dummies for seven broad occupational classifications: 
Professional/Technical Workers, Managers, Sales Workers, Clerical Workers, 
Craftsman, Laborers, and Service Workers.  
Months 
unemployed 
Number of months unemployed between the current job and the most recent 
job if there was a layoff in the most recent job. Coded as 0 if there was no 
previous job or if the unemployment was not due to layoff. Controls for 




Yearly national unemployment rate. Controls for differences in turnover 
propensity due to ease of movement differences (e.g., March & Simon, 1958; 




Yearly local unemployment rate. Controls for differences in turnover 
propensity due to ease of movement differences (e.g., March & Simon, 1958; 
Trevor, 2001).  
Job changes The number of job changes prior to the present job, excluding changes due to 
layoff, following Judge and Watanabe’s (Judge & Watanabe, 1995) finding 
that past quits predicted future quits.   
Age Age in years. Controls for non-work responsibilities that vary with age and 
influence voluntary turnover likelihood (e.g., financial responsibility).  
Marital status Coded as 0 for unmarried, 1 for married. Controls for the finding that married 
individuals are less likely to quit (Abelson, 1987) 
Number of 
children 
The respondent’s number of living children. Controls for differences in 
turnover propensity attributable to children (e.g., Abelson, 1987).   
Residential area Coded as 0 for rural area, 1 for urban area. Controls for individual differences 
in turnover propensity resulting from environmental characteristics (Judge & 
Watanabe, 1995; March & Simon, 1958). 
Education level The highest grade completed as of May of the survey year. Controls for 
mobility differences stemming from differences in education level (e.g., 
March & Simon, 1958; Trevor, 2001). 
Log hourly pay Logarithm of CPI-adjusted hourly pay rate. Controls for effects of hierarchical 
level and individual earnings on turnover propensity (e.g., Trevor, 2001). 
Mean occupational 
pay 
CPI-adjusted hourly pay, averaged across year and 3-digit occupational code 
(2-digit code when < 20 respondents; e.g., Lee et al., 2008; Trevor, 2001). 
Weekly hours Hours worked per week. Controls for differences in voluntary turnover 
propensity arising from weekly work hours.  
Employer size Number of individuals employed at current job location (in 100s). Controls for 
individual differences in turnover propensity resulting from visibility or 
internal transfer (e.g., March & Simon, 1956; Mobley et al., 1979). 
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Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlationsa
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Voluntary Turnover 0.21 0.41 1.00
2. Layoff (ever) 0.62 0.49 0.05 1.00
3. Layoff (most recent job) 0.36 0.48 0.03 1.00 1.00
4. Cumulative layoffs 1.06 1.31 0.02 0.63 0.71 1.00
5. Wage underemployment (Cat.) 0.46 0.73 0.08 0.11 0.21 0.07 1.00
6. Wage underemployment (Cont.) -0.21 0.68 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.45 1.00
7. Hours underemployment -0.02 0.21 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 1.00
8. Job satisfaction 3.20 0.79 -0.18 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 1.00
9. Months unemployed 2.46 11.78 0.01 0.16 0.36 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.01 -0.02 1.00
10. National unemployment rate 6.06 1.17 -0.13 -0.21 -0.16 -0.16 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.04 1.00
11. Local unemployment rate 6.64 2.81 -0.07 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.42 1.00
12. Job changes 5.70 4.41 0.06 0.30 0.13 0.30 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.21 -0.08 1.00
13. Age 31.82 7.03 0.02 0.41 0.36 0.33 0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.13 -0.30 -0.11 0.46
14. Marital status (Married = 1) 0.53 0.50 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.01 0.11
15. Number of children 1.17 1.27 0.03 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.16 -0.01 0.18
16. Residential area (Urban = 1) 0.79 0.41 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.11 -0.03
17. Education level 12.55 2.15 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.08 0.02
18. Log hourly pay 1.83 0.56 -0.12 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.25 -0.22 0.01 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 0.04
19. Mean occupational pay 7.95 3.69 -0.02 0.11 0.09 0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.05 0.01 -0.14 -0.09 0.11
20. Weekly hours 42.62 8.15 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.41 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.11
21. Employer size 4.89 26.59 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.05
(table continued on next page)
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Table 3 (Continued). Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlationsa
Variable 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. Voluntary Turnover
2. Layoff (ever)
3. Layoff (most recent job)
4. Cumulative layoffs
5. Wage underemployment (Cat.)




10. National unemployment rate
11. Local unemployment rate
12. Job changes
13. Age 1.00
14. Marital status (Married = 1) 0.28 1.00
15. Number of children 0.36 0.35 1.00
16. Residential area (Urban = 1) -0.03 -0.11 -0.04 1.00
17. Education level 0.18 0.01 -0.11 0.11 1.00
18. Log hourly pay 0.20 0.14 0.01 0.08 0.29 1.00
19. Mean occupational pay 0.26 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.28 0.36 1.00
20. Weekly hours 0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.09 1.00
21. Employer size -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.04 -0.01 1.00
aN = 12,035 job spells for all variables except "Layoff (most recent job)", where N = 6,747 job spells
All correlations greater than |.01| are statistically significant, p < .05.
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Table 4. Results of Survival Regression Analyses Predicting Voluntary Turnover
Independent Variablec HR HR HR s.e. HR s.e. HR s.e.
Months unemployed 0.9995 0.002 0.998 0.002 0.99 0.003 *** 0.998 0.002 0.997 0.002
National unemployment rate 0.80 0.02 *** 0.81 0.02 *** 0.79 0.04 *** 0.81 0.02 *** 0.81 0.02 ***
Local unemployment rate 1.0002 0.01 1.0001 0.01 1.012 0.02 1.00003 0.01 0.9996 0.01
Job changes 0.87 0.01 *** 0.86 0.01 *** 0.83 0.02 *** 0.86 0.01 *** 0.86 0.01 ***
Age 1.08 0.01 *** 1.07 0.01 *** 1.10 0.02 *** 1.06 0.01 *** 1.06 0.01 ***
Marital status 1.35 0.11 *** 1.33 0.11 *** 1.55 0.21 *** 1.33 0.11 *** 1.32 0.11 ***
Number of children 1.23 0.06 *** 1.24 0.06 *** 1.25 0.10 ** 1.25 0.06 *** 1.24 0.06 ***
Residential area 1.04 0.09 1.03 0.09 1.22 0.18 1.03 0.09 1.04 0.09
Education level 0.99 0.05 0.99 0.05 1.03 0.08 1.001 0.05 0.998 0.05
Log hourly pay 0.45 0.03 *** 0.46 0.03 *** 0.39 0.05 *** 0.46 0.03 *** 0.46 0.03 ***
Mean occupational pay 0.99 0.01 0.98 0.01 * 0.97 0.02 0.99 0.01 0.98 0.01 *
Weekly hours 1.006 0.003 * 1.006 0.003 * 1.0001 0.01 1.006 0.003 * 1.006 0.003 *
Employer size 0.998 0.001 * 0.998 0.001 * 0.99 0.004 0.998 0.001 * 0.998 0.001 *
Layoff (ever) 1.56 0.13 ***
Layoff (most recent job) 1.65 0.19 ***
Cumulative layoffs 1.39 0.06 *** 1.63 0.11 ***
Cumulative layoffs2 0.97 0.01 ***
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald test statistic (X2)
aN = 12,035 job spells; bN = 6,747 job spells.
cIndustry and occupation dummies are included but not reported.
*p < .05, one-tailed test; **p < .01, one-tailed test; ***p < .001, one-tailed test.
707.38***695.57***375.06***667.18***637.03***
-3655.44 -3640.36 -1153.63 -3626.17 -3620.27
Model 2aModel 1a
s.e.s.e.
Model 5aModel 4aModel 3b
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Table 5. Mediation Analyses for Underemployment and Job Satisfaction in the Layoff - Voluntary Turnover Relationship
Independent Variablec b b b b se b se b se b se b se
Months unemployed -0.01 0.003 *** -0.01 0.003 *** -0.01 0.003 *** -0.01 0.003 *** -0.01 0.003 *** -0.01 0.003 *** -0.007 0.003 ** -0.01 0.003 *
National unemployment rate -0.24 0.05 *** -0.25 0.05 *** -0.24 0.05 *** -0.24 0.05 *** -0.23 0.05 *** -0.23 0.05 *** -0.194 0.05 *** -0.19 0.05 ***
Local unemployment rate 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.003 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.006 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Job changes -0.19 0.03 *** -0.19 0.03 *** -0.19 0.03 *** -0.19 0.03 *** -0.18 0.03 *** -0.18 0.03 *** -0.142 0.02 *** -0.14 0.02 ***
Age 0.10 0.14 *** 0.09 0.02 *** 0.09 0.02 *** 0.10 0.02 *** 0.10 0.02 *** 0.09 0.02 *** 0.08 0.01 *** 0.08 0.01 ***
Marital status 0.44 0.02 *** 0.42 0.14 ** 0.42 0.14 ** 0.44 0.14 *** 0.42 0.14 ** 0.40 0.14 ** 0.39 0.12 *** 0.40 0.12 ***
Number of children 0.22 0.08 ** 0.23 0.08 ** 0.22 0.08 ** 0.22 0.08 ** 0.19 0.09 0.19 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.07
Residential area 0.20 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.14
Education level 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.001 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Log hourly pay -0.95 0.12 *** -0.83 0.13 *** -0.76 0.13 *** -0.95 0.12 *** -0.80 0.12 *** -0.64 0.13 *** -0.678 0.10 *** -0.68 0.10 ***
Mean occupational pay -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 * -0.03 0.02 * -0.019 0.01 * -0.02 0.01
Weekly hours 0.0001 0.01 0.0001 0.01 -0.001 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.008 0.004 -0.01 0.004 *
Employer size -0.01 0.004 -0.01 0.004 -0.01 0.004 -0.01 0.004 -0.01 0.004 -0.01 0.004 -0.006 0.004 -0.01 0.004
Layoff (most recent job) 0.50 0.12 *** 0.48 0.12 *** 0.47 0.12 *** 0.50 0.12 *** 0.49 0.12 *** 0.46 0.12 *** 0.38 0.11 *** 0.38 0.11 ***
Wage underemployment (cont.) 0.24 0.07 ***
Wage underemployment (cat.) 0.21 0.05 *** 0.19 0.06 ***
Hours underemployment 0.43 0.22 *
Job satisfaction -0.53 0.05 *** -0.52 0.05 ***
Hours underemployment (with PT Jobs) 0.004 0.03
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald test statistic (X2)
Decrease in layoff effectd
aN = 6,747 job spells; bN = 7,470 job spells
cIndustry and occupation dummies are included but not reported.
dDecrease in layoff effect (i.e., percent mediation) reflects the difference between 'layoff (most recent job)' coefficients in models with and without mediators and is created using unrounded coefficients.
*p < .05, one-tailed test; **p < .01, one-tailed test; ***p < .001, one-tailed test.
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Table 6. Results of Competing Risks Survival Regression Analyses Predicting Voluntary Turnover Pathways
Independent Variableb HR HR HR HR
Months unemployed 1.0026 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.9904 0.01 1.003 0.01
National unemployment rate 0.53 0.11 *** 0.55 0.06 *** 0.56 0.05 *** 0.90 0.09
Local unemployment rate 0.98 0.06 0.95 0.04 0.95 0.03 1.03 0.05
Job changes 0.63 0.08 *** 0.70 0.04 *** 0.69 0.04 *** 0.82 0.05 **
Age 1.03 0.06 1.08 0.04 * 1.05 0.03 * 1.12 0.04 **
Marital status 1.46 0.63 1.35 0.36 1.38 0.30 0.65 0.21
Number of children 1.54 0.43 1.22 0.23 1.33 0.20 * 1.24 0.28
Residential area 0.51 0.27 1.67 0.49 * 1.17 0.29 1.03 0.33
Education level 1.57 0.43 1.49 0.32 * 1.39 0.22 * 0.89 0.21
Log hourly pay 0.55 0.17 * 0.27 0.07 *** 0.38 0.07 *** 0.32 0.09 ***
Mean occupational pay 0.89 0.06 0.996 0.03 0.97 0.03 0.97 0.04
Weekly hours 1.02 0.02 0.99 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.01
Employer size 1.00 0.01 0.96 0.02 * 0.98 0.01 * 0.99 0.01
Wage underemployment (cat.) 0.77 0.14 1.13 0.12 1.06 0.09 1.12 0.13
Job satisfaction 0.50 0.09 *** 0.43 0.04 *** 0.46 0.04 *** 0.53 0.06 ***
Cumulative layoffs 1.88 0.55 * 1.63 0.26 ** 1.66 0.22 *** 1.07 0.20
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald test statistic (X2)
N = 4,206 job spells.
aBecause a job offer, whether unsolicited or solicited, affords the individual complete ease of movement out of one job and into another, we evaluate 
 Hypotheses 6 and 7 by assessing the influence of a layoff history on these turnover pathways both separately (Models 1 and 2) and combined (Model 3). 
bIndustry and occupation dummies are included but not reported.
*p < .05, one-tailed test; **p < .01, one-tailed test; ***p < .001, one-tailed test.
96.91*** 422.90*** 477.18*** 137.05***
s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e.
-133.18 -361.72 -516.08 -265.95
Predicting Quit to Take an
Unsolicited Offer
Predicting Quit to Take a
Solicited Offer
Predicting Quit to 
Search for Offers
Model 2 Model 3a Model 4Model 1
Predicting Quit to Take Either an
Unsolicited or a Solicited Offer
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Table 7. Layoff Effect Estmates from Between-Subjects Survival Regression Analyses Predicting Voluntary Turnover
Layoff Predictor
HR HR HR s.e.
HR HR HR s.e.
HR HR HR s.e.
Cumulative layoffs 1.05 0.02 * 1.09 0.03 ** 1.06 0.03 **
Cumulative layoffs2 0.99 0.00 * 0.99 0.00 ** 0.99 0.00 **
aN = 27,480 job spells; bN = 28,937 job spells; cN = 22,170; dN = 23,369.














Note: Models include all covariates listed in Table 2 of the revised manuscript and, following Allison’s (1984) 
recommendations for panel data, each individual’s number of previous quits and the length of the job spell prior to the 
focal job spell. 
Model 1a Model 2b Model 3b
Model 4c Model 5d Model 6d
s.e. s.e.






•  Psychological contract violation, altered general employment 
schema, and reduced felt obligation 
•  Reduced trust 
•  Shock-driven attention to external job opportunities 
•  Greater job insecurity 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model Linking Layoffs to Voluntary Turnover 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Constructs surrounded by solid lines are measured; broken lines denote the conceptual explanation for unmeasured processes.  
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